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Banks predominantly finance long-term loans using whole-
sale debt. But some of these debt claims can be withdrawn 
at short notice exposing banks to funding illiquidity risk. 
Since issuing new debt at short notice can sometimes be 
prohibitively expensive or only possible with a time lag, two 
new liquidity requirements have recently been introduced to 
mitigate liquidity shortfalls.
While the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) reduces funding 
risk over a longer time horizon, the liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR) promotes the short-term resilience of banks’ liquidity 
risk profile, requiring banks, from January 2018 onwards, to 
hold a sufficient stock of high-quality liquid assets, such as 
sovereign bonds, to fully cover net outflows for a 30-day 
stress scenario. 
These measures, however, may entail unintended side effects 
on banks’ loan supply (for an overview, see BCBS, 2016). 
One concern is that by requiring banks to hold more liquid 
assets, the LCR may crowd out the financing of loans. How-
ever, since the LCR has only been in operation since 2015, 
we lack sufficient data to quantitatively assess its effects on 
the real economy. Moreover, due to interactions with other 
regulatory instruments, indirect effects may mask the LCR‘s 
direct impact so that the latter may be difficult to identify. In 
Bucher et al. (2018) we thus use a theoretical model to 
examine the effect of the LCR and other instruments on a 
bank’s stability and loan supply. Interactions between different 
regulatory instruments are disregarded, which means that 
our paper cannot be interpreted as an all-encompassing 
assessment of these instruments.
Banks’ portfolio decision depends on credit risk 
Expanding on Bucher et al. (2013), we consider a profit-
maximising, forward-looking bank that decides on its invest-
ment and capital structure at the beginning of each period. 
By using internal funds, and raising equity and wholesale 
debt from external investors, the bank can invest in risky 
loans and hold risk-free liquid assets (see Chart 1). 
Regulatory requirements for banks are often criticised as having an adverse impact 
on lending and hence, indirectly, on the real economy. A new research paper uses a 
theoretical partial equilibrium model to study the direct effects a liquidity coverage 
ratio could have on banks’ loan supply.
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Our model assumes that it is more costly for the bank to issue 
equity when compared with wholesale debt. This refl ects 
governance issues between external shareholders and the 
bank’s management where, for example, the management 
possesses superior information regarding the bank’s risk pro-
fi le than the shareholders. While wholesale debt claims may 
be withdrawn early, equity claims are stable. Consequently, 
the bank will fail if its interim returns are insuffi cient to repay 
early withdrawals by debt holders. By issuing equity, the 
bank can mitigate such failure, but this is costly and can 
hamper the loan supply. Internal funds comprise retained 
earnings as well as the values of existing assets, such as out-
standing loans, and therefore cannot be changed at short 
notice. They are not as costly as external equity, but their 
volume hinges on past investment and funding decisions 
made by the bank and the performance of these investments. 
Two options for investment decision
The bank internalizes how loan credit risk will impact the 
availability of internal funds for its future investment decision. 
If these earnings turn out to be low, the bank will only possess 
few internal funds in the future, and it will become more 
diffi cult to use these as collateral to raise new funds exter-
nally. This, in turn, will constrain its future loan supply.
In the absence of regulation, a bank has two options. The 
fi rst is to grant more loans as a precaution. This will increase 
the bank’s internal funds at the interim, which will allow the 
bank to more easily issue new debt and increase the loan 
supply. As such, the bank is less exposed to the risk of failure 
and is less reliant on issuing debt to refi nance loans. We refer 
to this as the safe capital structure option. Loan supply, how-
ever, would very much depend on how economic conditions 
evolve and thus fl uctuate strongly over time. The second 
option is for the bank to be agnostic about the interim funding 
gap and delay any adjustment until the shock to internal 
funds has materialized. In this case, the bank would have less 
internal funds at the interim date to refi nance loans, and it 
would issue more debt when compared with the fi rst option. 
This, however, exposes the bank to a greater risk of failure. 
As such, we refer to this as the risky capital structure option. 
The bank’s decision depends on various parameters. If, for 
example, the credit risk on loans is high, this will impinge on 
the bank’s retained earnings, thereby forcing the bank to 
take on more debt even though this exposes the bank to a 
greater risk of failure. 
LCR brings greater stability, but loan volatility is stronger 
How does the LCR infl uence the bank’s choice on its capital 
structure? A bank required to comply with the LCR needs to 
hold a certain amount of liquid assets to cover total net cash 
outfl ows in each period. Provided the bank opts for a safe 
capital structure even without the LCR, the LCR will have no 
effect on loan supply. From the investors’ perspective, the 
bank’s debt is safe and, the return on debt is identical to the 
earnings from the liquid assets due to perfect competition. In 
order for the bank to comply with the regulatory requirement, 
it invests the newly raised debt into risk-free liquid assets. 
The balance sheet simply expands (see Chart 2).
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If, however, the bank opts for a risky capital structure, inves-
tors will be bound to have concerns that the bank could fail. 
They will demand a higher return on debt, which will also 
make it more expensive for the bank to invest in risk-free li-
quid assets. Without regulation, a bank with a risky capital 
structure will therefore have no incentive in our model to 
invest in liquid assets. If the bank’s earnings from its loans 
and thus its internal funds are low, the LCR works, economi-
cally speaking, like a tax. Debt is no longer available in its 
entirety to finance loans and must instead also be invested in 
unprofitable liquid assets. This constrains loan supply. A bank 
can dilute this effect of regulation by expanding its loan supply 
likewise to the first option as a precaution and building up addi-
tional internal funds so as to maximise its profit (see Chart 3).
Under the risky capital structure, the LCR induces an initial 
increase in the loan supply, which declines if retained ear-
nings turn out to be low. Furthermore, the “taxation” of debt 
cuts into the profit made by the bank such that, even when 
loans entail greater earnings risks, the bank opts for a safe 
capital structure. Our findings therefore indicate that the LCR 
increases stability but also has the potential to trigger greater 
volatility in bank’s loan supply. As the model disregards pos-
sible feedback effects our paper should not be interpreted as 
an all-encompassing assessment of the LCR but rather of its 
direct incentive effects on banks. 
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Conclusion: 
We show that the effects of the liquidity coverage ratio on loan supply depend on the capital structure selected by an unregu-
lated bank. Banks that already have a solid capital structure without this regulation are likely to be able to meet the new 
requirements by simply expanding their balance sheets and not constraining their loan supply. The LCR may give other banks 
an additional incentive to lower balance sheet risks. This may, however, result in a more volatile loans supply, depending on 
the earnings risks associated with loans.
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